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Rolling back the reasonable man - but how far? 
 





Leslie Hall James was convicted, at Nottingham Crown Court on May 1 
1979, of the murder of his wife, and sentenced to life imprisonment - a plea of 
provocation having failed. He had stabbed, punched and suffocated her 
following an argument. On the morning of the killing he had left work and 
gone to her home carrying a knife he borrowed from a colleague, he said, in 
order to cut a cork template. After killing her he went back to work returning 
again to the house during his lunch hour to change the locks. Later that 
afternoon he collected his daughter from school. The background to this killing 
was that Mrs James had left the matrimonial home in December 1978 and 
formed a relationship with another man (Mr Dutfield). The police had been 
called on several occasions to disturbances between Dutfield, the appellant and 
Mrs James.  
On March 23 1982, James’ appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed. 
On completion of a life sentence, he was released on license and subsequently 
made an application to the Criminal Cases Review Commission to have his 
case referred back to the Court of Appeal following the expansion of 
provocation in the House of Lords ruling in Smith1 (which permitted the 
admission of psychiatric evidence in an assessment of capacity for self-
control). Why would James wish to appeal his conviction having already 
served his sentence? One can only surmise that he would rather the stigma of a 
conviction for manslaughter-provocation than the stigma of murder. 
Furthermore, not only is a conviction for provocation considered less morally 
blameworthy but on completion of a prison sentence no conditions are 
* BA (CNAA), MA, PhD (Manc), LLM (Reading), Professor of Law, Deputy Dean of 
Law, University of Buckingham; Barrister, (Door Tenant) Clarendon Chambers, 1 
Plowden Buildings, Temple, London, EC4Y 9BU9. 
1 R v Smith (Morgan) [2000] 4 All ER 289. 
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attached, whereas following completion of a sentence for murder an offender is 
released “on license” which means that at any time he may be recalled to prison 
if his behaviour “gives cause for concern.”  “Cause for concern” includes 
whether the licensee’s continued liberty would present a risk to the safety of 
others or whether the licensee is likely to commit further imprisonable 
offences; the extent to which the licensee has failed to comply with the 
conditions of the license or otherwise failed to co-operate with the supervising 
officer; and whether the licensee is likely to comply with the conditions of the 
license and agree to supervision if allowed to remain in the community. On  
September 15 2004,  the Criminal Cases Review Commission referred the case 
back to the Court of Appeal.  
 
Jamal Karimi 
Jamal Karimi was convicted at St Alban’s Crown Court on July 29 1997, 
of the murder of his wife’s lover, Sirvan Kabadi - a defence of provocation 
having failed. The background to this case is complex. In 1984, the appellant 
joined the Communist Freedom Fighting Movement in Kurdistan and in 1986 
married Mehri Rezai, a member of the same movement. By 1990 their 
relationship began to deteriorate.   Mehri Rezai came to England in April 1994 
and the appellant joined her shortly afterwards. The relationship broke down in 
February 1996, and the appellant moved out of the family home. Subsequently, 
the appellant became friendly with a man called Sirvan Kabadi, who also 
became intimately associated with the appellant’s estranged wife.  On 
December 4 1996, Rezai told the appellant that their relationship was over.  On 
December 6, the appellant met with Mr Kabadi, they argued and the defendant 
killed Mr Kabadi with a knife inflicting numerous stab wounds including 
cutting the deceased’s throat. The appellant immediately admitted the killing to 
police. The defences advanced at the trial were that his responsibility was 
diminished because of post-traumatic stress disorder following his experiences 
in Kurdistan; provocation as the deceased had said to the appellant “Besharef” 
which means, “you have no honour,” and self-defence on the basis that the 
deceased came at the appellant with a knife. Self-defence was rejected and so 
the issues for the jury were whether the appellant had been provoked and 
whether he was suffering from diminished responsibility. The jury, not 
persuaded by either of these defences, convicted Karimi of murder. Mr 
Karimi's application for leave to appeal against conviction was refused on 1 
May 1998. He placed an application before the  Criminal Cases Review 
Commission on  September 4, 1998 and on June 24, 2003 they  referred the 
case to the Court of Appeal. An appeal against conviction was allowed in 
February 20052 and a retrial directed. Between the appeal and the retrial 
2 R v Karimi (Jamal) [2005] EWCA Crim 369. 
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Holley3 intervened. At the retrial, at the Central Criminal Court, on October 4 
2005, the judge followed Holley (which had been decided on March 15, 16, 17; 
June 15 2005) in directing the jury as to the law. The appellant was once again 
convicted of murder. Karimi was sentenced to a life term. 
 
THE COURT OF APPEAL 
 
These two appeals against convictions for murder were heard together 
before Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers CJ, Sir Igor Judge P, Poole, Bean and 
Dobbs JJ, on December 19 2005 and January 25 2006, as each turned on the 
correct interpretation of the second limb of the test for a defence of provocation 
which is concerned with a defendant’s capacity for self-control. Both 
appellants wished to rely on psychiatric evidence, (following the ruling in 
Smith4 which allowed consideration of psychiatric evidence even though the 
evidence was free standing and not related to the characteristic) with respect to 
their capacity for self-control. The outcome of each appeal depended on 
whether the Court of Appeal considered, the definitive statement on the 
capacity for self-control in provocation, the decision of the House of Lords in 
Smith or a subsequent decision of the Privy Council on an appeal from Jersey 
in Holley. As decisions of the Privy Council, taken at their highest, were 
persuasive it could be reasonably predicted that the ruling in Smith would 
prevail. Indeed, Lord Phillips CJ in the Appeal Court said:  
 
“[20]. Normally the result in A-G for Jersey v Holley would 
have been a foregone conclusion. The majority decision in R v 
Smith (Morgan) would have been followed and the appeal 
would have been dismissed. The jurisprudence of the Privy 
Council had established that, where an appeal turned on a point 
of English law, or law identical to English law, the Privy 
Council should follow a decision of the House of Lords.”5
 
Further, a previous decision of the Privy Council in Luc6 had been eschewed 
precisely because the doctrine of precedent demanded that decisions of the 
higher courts were binding. The Court of Appeal reviewed both lines of 
authorities.  
In Smith, the House of Lords (Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Hoffmann, 
Lord Clyde, Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough and Lord Millett) by a majority 
3 A-G for Jersey v Holley [2005] 3 All ER 371. 
4 Ibid note 1. 
5 R v James; R v Karimi, Court of Appeal, (Criminal Division) [2006] 1 All ER 759 
para 20. 
6 Luc Thiet Thuan v R [1996] 2 All ER 1033. 
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of three to two, resolved the ambiguity which had arisen in English law 
regarding whether the gravity of the provocation should be considered of 
relevance to the characteristics of the reasonable man only, or whether the 
gravity of the provocation could also be considered of relevance to the question 
of a defendant’s capacity for self-control. The certified question for the House 
was framed in this way: “Are characteristics other than age and sex, 
attributable to the reasonable man, for the purpose of section 3 of the Homicide 
Act 1957, relevant not only to the gravity of the provocation to him but also to 
the standard of self-control to be expected?” Their Lordships ruled that mental 
characteristics, which amounted to a mental “affliction”, could properly be 
considered as relevant to the capacity for self-control. Smith was suffering 
from depression and psychiatric evidence was admitted:  
 
“…expert witnesses [also] considered his susceptibility to react 
to provocation. A psychiatrist called by the defence, who had 
seen Smith in prison less than a fortnight after the offence, said 
that he was suffering from an abnormality of the mind, namely 
depression, which could reduce his “threshold for erupting 
with violence.” Another said that he was suffering from 
clinical depression which made him “more disinhibited”, ie 
less able to control his reactions.”7  
 
(Their Lordships use of the term “affliction” was deliberate as they wished 
to preserve some semblance of a distinction between the defence of 
provocation and that of diminished responsibility, the latter turning on mental 
abnormality. In the words of Lord Clyde, Smith was suffering from “some 
affliction which falls short of mental abnormality.”) In considering Smith’s 
mental characteristic they relied on that part of Lord Diplock’s ruling in 
Camplin8 in which he held that: “when considering the standard of self-control 
required to satisfy section 3, there must be attributed to the reasonable man any 
special characteristics of the defendant.” Their Lordships in Smith ruled that the 
capacity for self-control was neither a fixed, nor an immutable standard and 
could be considered separately and quite independently from any characteristic 
on which a defendant relied in respect of the first limb of the test (Lord 
Hobhouse of Woodborough and Lord Millet dissenting).  
Moreover, the House of Lords had not only ruled that the standard of self-
control was variable but also introduced a moral dimension into the 
consideration of whether a defendant’s capacity for self-control was reduced. 
Lord Hoffman in his judgment said that a jury should find the defence of 
7 Smith note 1, per Lord Hoffman para 3 at 299b.  
8 DPP v Camplin [1978] 2 All ER 168. 
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provocation made out where they thought “that the circumstances were such 
as to make the loss of self-control sufficiently excusable to reduce the gravity 
of the offence from murder to manslaughter.”9 This part of the judgment 
created the most concern. Many were not happy with the ruling in Smith since 
it widened the second limb of the test and took the ordinary man of provocation 
over the line into the territory of the diminished man of diminished 
responsibility, and, in addition, allowed a jury to find provocation where they 
considered “that the circumstances were such as to make the loss of self-control 
sufficiently excusable.” There were many who could not wait for an 
opportunity to voice their objections. Holley provided the opportunity.  
In Holley, the appellant, the Attorney General for Jersey appealed against 
the decision of the Court of Appeal of Jersey to substitute a conviction for 
manslaughter for a conviction for murder in the case of the respondent Holley 
who was a chronic alcoholic. Holley admitted killing his girlfriend with an axe. 
The deceased had said to Holley, “You haven’t got the guts” Holley struck and 
killed her. The issue was whether the jury should have been directed that his 
chronic alcoholism was a matter to be taken into account by the jury when 
considering whether, having regard to the actual provocation and their view of 
its gravity, a person having ordinary powers of self-control would have done 
what he did. The Privy Council (nine Lords of Appeal in Ordinary) allowing 
the appeal (Lords Bingham, Hoffmann and Carswell dissenting), held that the 
issue for the jury was whether the provocation was enough to make a 
reasonable man do as the defendant had done and that a “reasonable man” 
meant a person of ordinary powers of self-control. The Privy Council ruled that 
the standard of self-control was uniform and objective and was not to be judged 
by the self-control which the defendant was able to exercise in the view of the 
jury. With specific regard to chronic alcoholism the Privy Council said: 
 
“[24] Their Lordships mention some ancillary points. The first 
is relevant to the facts in the present case. It concerns 
application of the principles discussed above in circumstances 
where the defendant acted under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs and, therefore, at a time when his level of self-control 
may have been reduced. If the defendant was taunted on 
account of his intoxication, that may be a relevant matter for 
the jury to take into account when assessing the gravity of the 
taunt to the defendant. But the defendants intoxicated state is 
not a matter to be taken into account by the jury when 
considering whether the defendant exercised ordinary self-
control. The position is the same, so far as provocation is 
9 Smith ibid note 1 at 312h. 
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concerned, if the defendant’s addiction to alcohol has reached 
the stage that he is suffering from the disease of alcoholism.”10
 
In James and Karimi it fell to be determined which of these two cases, 
(Smith or Holley) representing as they do conflicting strands of judicial 
opinion, stood as authority for the correct interpretation of the law in respect of 
the capacity for self-control. The Court of Appeal much to the surprise of 
counsel for the appellants (because of the constitutional position of the House 
of Lords and the Privy Council) followed the Privy Council and not the House 
of Lords. It considered itself able to do so and thereby effectively subvert Smith 
because of the unique composition of the Privy Council. (The Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council usually sits with a maximum of five 
members). Uniquely the Privy Council in Holley consisted of nine Lords of 
Appeal in Ordinary. However, the constitution of the Judicial Committee in 
Holley was no accident. As Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers CJ stated: 
 
“23. The procedure adopted and the comments of members of 
the Board in Holley suggest that a decision must have been 
taken by those responsible for the constitution of the Board in 
Holley … to use the appeal as a vehicle for reconsidering the 
decision of the House of Lords in Morgan Smith, not just as 
representing the law of Jersey but as representing the law of 
England. A decision was taken that the Board hearing the 
appeal to the Privy Council should consist of nine of the twelve 
Lords of Appeal in Ordinary. Those sitting were Lord 
Bingham of Cornhill, the senior Law Lord, Lord Nicholls of 
Birkenhead, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord 
Scott of Foscote, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Lord Walker of 
Gestingthorpe, Baroness Hale of Richmond and Lord Carswell. 
…24.…the Board divided six/three. The majority concluded 
that Morgan Smith had been wrongly decided and that the 
majority in Luc Thiet Thuan had accurately stated the law. The 
dissentients were Lord Bingham, Lord Hoffmann and Lord 
Carswell.”11
 
As to the correct interpretation of the law, the Court of Appeal in James 
and Karimi found the ruling in Holley to be correct: 
 
10 Holley, ibid note 3, para 24.  
11 R v James; R v Karimi ibid note 5. 
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“27 [22] Under the statute the sufficiency of the provocation 
(‘whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable 
man do as [the defendant] did’) is to be judged by one 
standard, not a standard which varies from defendant to 
defendant. Whether the provocative act or words and the 
defendant’s response met the ‘ordinary person’ standard 
prescribed by the statute is the question the jury must consider, 
not the altogether looser question of whether, having regard to 
all the circumstances, the jury consider the loss of self-control 
was sufficiently excusable. The statute does not leave each jury 
free to set whatever standard they consider appropriate in the 





The judicial manoeuvres over the past decade have witnessed an expansion 
both of the first limb, that is the characteristics that can be properly attributed 
to the reasonable man, and also the second limb with regard to the capacity for 
self-control. This expansion has benefited battered women whose fear and 
trauma (battered women syndrome) has been considered a characteristic under 
the first limb (Aluwahlia13) and also a characteristic with the potential for 
having a direct bearing on the capacity for self-control (second limb) (Thornton 
No 2).14
The capacity for self-control of the reasonable person of provocation 
following Holley appears to have been rolled back to an objective standard. But 
it is difficult to see how a person’s capacity for self-control can be totally 
severed from the characteristic(s) of the defendant unless that part of Lord 
Diplock’s speech quoted above on Camplin is to be ignored or re-encoded.  In 
a dissenting judgment in Holley, Lord Carswell described the majority’s 
approach as “illogical, inexplicable and unjust.” He could not see any 
convincing logical ground for the distinction between response characteristics 
and control characteristics. He also considered that jurors would find the 
distinction hard to understand. He said:  
 
12 Holley, ibid note 3, para 27.  
13 R v Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 889, per Lord Taylor “However, the endorsement of 
the New Zealand authority in R v Newell shows that characteristics relating to the 
mental state or personality of an individual can also be taken into account by the jury, 
providing they have the necessary degree of permanence.” 
14 R v Thornton (No 2) [1996] 2 All ER 1023. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
188 
                                                     
“I am rather in wholehearted agreement with the remark of 
Thomas J in the New Zealand case of R v Rongonui [2000] 2 
NZLR 385 at 446 that most trial judges had seen  - “the glazed 
look in the jurors” eyes as, immediately after instructing them 
that it is open to them to have regard to the accused’s alleged 
characteristic in assessing the gravity of the provocation, they are 
then advised that they must revert to the test of the ordinary 
person and disregard that characteristic when determining the 
sufficiency of the accused’s loss of self-control.” 
 
The problem with Holley (and James and Karimi) is that very little is said 
about which aspects of any previous rulings remain good law, or to what 
particular aspects this resiling pertains. If the Law Commission in Partial 
Defences to Murder had identified the problem of provocation post-Smith 
correctly when stating, “  …there is now no clear test for differentiating 
between a “provoked killing” and a “revenge killing”,15 driving out all 
flexibility with regard to the capacity for self-control is not the solution. But I 
am not certain that Holley will have that effect. 
If Holley is confined to its own facts, it is chronic alcoholism that cannot be 
considered as relevant to reducing a person’s capacity for self-control. This is 
not new, after all, it has always been the case, as expressed  by Lord Goff, that 
“being drunk, or high with drugs or glue – at the relevant time…may not be so 
taken into account, because that, …is excluded as a matter of policy.”16 The 
central objection to Smith expressed in Holley, was to the idea that provocation 
could be found if  “circumstances were such as to make the loss of self-control 
sufficiently excusable.” The objection is understandable. This utterance of Lord 
Hoffman’s was bound to create problems. It is interesting that it was Lord 
Hoffman, who said so much in support of the predicament of battered women; 
was critical of the way in which some men assumed a proprietoriality over 
women – “possessiveness and jealousy should not today be an acceptable 
reason for loss of self-control,”17 and also concerned that a line should be held 
against the complete erosion of the objective element, should then leave this 
matter to what must be the whim, moral hubris and prejudice of jurors who 
would be left to interpret this in such a way as to undermine protection for 
women. Although he did suggest “ a direction that characteristics such as 
jealousy and obsession should be ignored in relation to  the objective element.” 
18  
15 Law Commission Partial Defences to Murder, Consultation Paper, No 173 (London: 
TSO 2003)  p 12, para 1.51. 
16 R v Morhall [1995] 3 All ER  at 667e-f. 
17 Smith ibid note 1 at 309b. 
18 Smith ibid note 1 at 309c. 
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But what is not clear, is just how far the law will roll back. The Privy 
Council in Holley said that the Privy Council in Luc had ruled correctly on the 
interpretation of the law. Did the court in Holley mean some of Luc, or all of it? 
There is a sea of difference between those cases where there is absolutely no 
nexus whatsoever between the characteristic and the capacity for self-control, 
and  cases  where there is a clear nexus between the characteristic(s) relied 
upon and the capacity for self-control. In the latter case surely where such a 
nexus exists the characteristic(s) can also be considered with regard to the 
second limb-  that is the capacity for  self-control? If this is not the case  then 
battered women will face, once again, a precarious situation of pleading 
provocation and being likely to fail.   
Let us be clearly reminded, Lord Taylor CJ had ruled in Thornton No 219 
that the nexus between a characteristic and the capacity for self-control could 
not be ignored: 
 
“The severity of such a syndrome and the extent to which it 
may have affected a particular defendant will no doubt vary 
and it is for the jury to consider… it may form an important 
background to whatever triggered the actus reus. A jury may 
more readily find there was a sudden loss of control triggered 
by even a minor incident, if the defendant had endured abuse 
over a period, on the “last straw” basis.”20
 
It is also to be noted that Lord Goff in Luc left this matter open when he stated: 
 
“Their Lordships wish to add, as a footnote, that it may be 
open to a defendant to establish provocation in circumstances 
in which the act of the deceased, though relatively 
unprovocative if taken in isolation, was the last of a series of 
acts which finally provoked the loss of self-control by the 
defendant and so precipitated his extreme reaction which led to 
the death of the deceased… Whether such a principle could 
successfully be invoked in cases such as, for example, the 
“battered wife syndrome” is a matter upon which their 
Lordships can in the present case express no opinion, having 
heard no argument upon it, but must await a case in which the 
point arises for decision.”21
 
19 Ibid note 14 [1996] 2 All ER 1023. 
20 Ibid note 14 at 1030c. 
21 Ibid note 6 at 1047a-c. 
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This surely must remain the position post-Holley. So it is open for counsel to 
re-open this point and the court to rule upon it. We await a case in which the 
point arises for decision. 
Let us remember that whilst the law continues with this debate, some 
defendants will serve life terms (Karimi). Statistics published by the Home 
Office22 show that over the last ten years the proportion of convictions for 
murder of all homicide convictions has increased steadily from 45 to 54 per 
cent, whilst for the same period convictions for provocation and no intent 
manslaughter have fluctuated between 39 and 43 per cent. Diminished 
responsibility manslaughter expressed as a proportion of all homicide 
convictions for the same period has declined from 15 to 3 per cent. The 
increase in murder convictions may be attributable to the real increase in the 
use of lethal weapons and the fact that public opinion and therefore jurors are 
getting “tougher on crime.” It is suggested that the impact of Smith may have 
resulted in an increase in provocation defences and convictions in those cases 
where previously provocation might have failed. The decline in diminished 
responsibility may also be in part the result of the shadow of Smith in that 
psychiatric evidence at least since 2001 was admissible in provocation causing 
defendants to plead provocation rather than diminished responsibility. This is 
of course speculation and more detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this 
case commentary. What is certain however is that following the Court of 
Appeal in James and Karimi, provocation as a defence, and/or the number of 
cases where provocation is successfully pleaded, will decline. 
Lord Hailsham, when Lord Chancellor, said of Lord Denning: “The trouble 
with Tom Denning is he’s always re-making the law and we never know where 
we are.”23 This is as true of the law on provocation, though Lord Denning had 
no hand in this debate. We have rolled back the law on provocation, but how 
far? We have certainly rolled back to pre-Smith. But are we in a post-Luc 
phase? It seems strange that the Privy Council in Holley, who, with the 
opportunity as they saw it to redefine the correct limits of provocation did not 
go further and expound on precisely what these limits were and precisely how 
these limits were to be applied, whilst the Court of Appeal with no explanation 
at all has accepted that factors affecting the capacity for self-control are to be 
excluded, but that is all we can be certain of. The law will need to roll forward 
again before it settles.  
 
 
22 K Coleman, C Bird and D Povey Violent Crime Overview, Homicide and Gun Crime 
2004-2005,Supplementary volume to Crime in England and Wales 2004/2005 
(London: Home Office 2006) 02/06, Table 2.02. 
23 C Dyer, Guardian Unlimited, March 6 1999.  
 
